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I. Introduction 
 
This study explores the effects of democratization on the transformation process of East 
Asian developmental states, focusing on financial reform in Korea and Taiwan after the 
Asian crisis.  
 
 Korea and Taiwan are regarded as typical examples of developmental states. Both 
countries experienced rapid growth under authoritarian regimes and have continued 
sustainable development after their transitions to democratic rule in the late 1980s. To 
varying degrees, Korea and Taiwan also share other similar characteristics such as 
Confucian culture, national division, small and open economies, high quality human 
resources, high interest in education, and slow processes of democratic consolidation with 
economic stagnation. As Cumings (1987) stated, when the two countries are compared to 
the rest of the world, the similarities are remarkable.  
 
 However, there are also salient differences between the two countries. Each has 
responded differently to the pressures of globalization, democratization, and 
informatization. Korea was severely hit by the Asian crisis, whereas Taiwan weathered the 
storm with relatively minor damage. The differences revealed through intra-regional 
comparison suggest that each country has followed path-dependent development. This is 
contrary to the argument that powerful forces for change applied across borders can 
overwhelm institutional inertia (Thatcher 2004). 
 
 How do we explain these different processes of development? The developmental 
model, which used to be an engine of growth in the past, is blamed as the main cause of the 
crisis. However, some argue that democratization limited the state’s role of promoting 
financial reform and new industrial policies, and made the East Asian economic structure 
vulnerable to external shocks. Though less academic attention has been given to the 
developmental model since the Asian crisis in 1997, the debate on the state’s role continues. 
Thus, the transformation of developmental states provides an interesting case in examining 
how internal and external pressures for change can be reconciled and how democracy can 
become public goods for development in some states, and public bads in others. The 
analysis of developmental states may also give us some clues regarding the issue of 
conversion versus diversion of the capitalist system.1  
 
 The relationship between democracy and economic development has been a 
perennial question for policy makers as well as scholars. Is democratization a panacea or a 
                                                 
1 Some argue that modes of capitalism would converge along with globalization. But, according to the 
“varieties of capitalism” argument, different modes of coordination across states exist despite having the same 
system of capitalism. Coordinated market economies (CME) such as Germany show many differences as 
compared to liberal market economies (LME) such as the United States. As one comes to understand 
capitalism’s diverse modes of coordination, the argument of convergence to Anglo-American capitalism after 
recent globalization may be seen as somewhat hasty. Hall and Soskice (2001); Lim (2007). 
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problem for reform? Are democratization and economic reform mutually supportive 
processes or in tension with each other? Both Korea and Taiwan face the daunting task of 
accomplishing democratic consolidation with economic growth, a task made all the more 
difficult—and important—by the economic crisis that began in late 2008. The introduction 
of democracy, however, can sometimes present obstacles for economic and political reform, 
and many new democracies tend to be fragile. The first objective of this study is to explore 
whether democratization in Korea and Taiwan has led to economic reform, focusing on the 
financial sector. The sustainable development of an economy can only be achieved through 
economic reform. The study of whether democratization is compatible with economic 
reform is therefore worthwhile.  
 
 Another very important point of interest is that, as noted above, the transformation 
processes in Korea and Taiwan have been considerably different. Why does 
democratization’s effect on the transformation process vary across countries, and across 
sectors within a country? How can we explain that the changes in developmental states 
sometimes follow the pattern of continuity, and sometimes do not? According to 
Przeworski (1993), it may be because political institutions do matter for development. 
Focusing on regimes, however, does not seem to capture the relevant differences among 
developmental states. The paths taken by countries with different levels of political-
economic development vary across countries. East Asian developmental states have 
undergone substantial democratization largely as a consequence of rapid economic 
development. However, the path of democratization in one country is different from that in 
another, and the effects of democratization also vary. The second objective of this study is 
to explain why the reform process follows a “path-breaking” pattern in some developmental 
states, and a “path-dependent” and “non-reform” pattern in others. 
 
 This study focuses on the financial sector for two reasons. One is that significant 
reform in the financial sector has happened only recently, after the Asian crisis, in both 
countries. Thus it provides a good case study on how these new democratic systems 
respond to such massive external pressure for reform. The other is that the financial sector 
is the most rapidly expanding service sector. This paper extends the analysis to the recent 
development of the reform process in the newly expanding financial sector.2  
 
 This study may have three implications. First, it shows how forces for change such 
as globalization and democratization can be reconciled with political and economic reforms, 
and it explains why transformation processes vary across countries and sectors. Second, it 
provides a guideline on the management of the transformation process that can bring 
beneficial results and further development of East Asian countries, recognizing that modes 
                                                 
2 See Lim, Haeran, Korea’s Growth and Industrial Transformation, London: Macmillan Press Ltd. 1998,  
for a discussion of the transformation from light to heavy-chemical industries in the manufacturing sector, and 
Lim, Haeran, “Legacy of Developmental States: Industrial Policy and Governance in Korea and Taiwan,” 
presented at the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, April 2007, for an examination of the 
transformation of the information technology sector after democratization in Korea and Taiwan.  
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of governance must be changed as democratization proceeds. Third, this study suggests that 
the leaders of developing states seeking to emulate East Asian countries must first 
understand their own social and economic structures and choose appropriate processes of 
social and economic transformation.  
 
 This study first provides a theoretical framework to tackle both objectives of this 
study—whether democratization has led to economic reform in Korea and Taiwan, and 
why seemingly similar states may follow very different paths of reform. After briefly 
introducing previous discussions on the relationship between democratization and 
economic reform and suggesting some additional complementary factors to understand the 
relations, I attempt to provide a unified framework to explain the comprehensive process of 
reform. Comparative analysis of Korea and Taiwan will then be presented in Sections III 
and IV as case studies of the theoretical framework, emphasizing their financial reforms. In 
each section, the process of financial reform is described and interpreted with respect to the 
relation between democratization and reform process, in support of the arguments in 
Section II. Section V provides a brief summary of this study.  
 
 
II. A Theoretical Framework 
 
1. Democracy and Economic Reform 
 
Previous studies on the relationship between democracy and economic reform have 
centered on whether both can be consolidated simultaneously, and if so, under what 
conditions and in which sequence. Analysts have also debated whether economic reforms 
are easier to implement in authoritarian or democratic regimes.  
 
Some assert that democracies are at a disadvantage in achieving economic reform 
for two reasons. First, democracy can be seen as presenting obstacles to economic reform. 
Democracy increases citizen participation through various means, including elections. As 
the short-term net effect of reform on many citizens tends to be negative, people harmed or 
potentially harmed by reforms will oppose them by means of various opportunities in the 
democratic system. Politics trumps economics. Second, democratization results in 
decentralization of power within the government, and weakens the autonomy and efficiency 
of the government. In this sense, a democracy can undermine the successful 
implementation of economic reform.  
 
Those who are skeptical of the capacity of a democracy to achieve economic 
reform often point to Chile, China, and Russia. Economic reform in Chile was successful 
under Pinochet’s authoritarian regime. China chose to undergo economic reform prior to 
political reform, and this plan has been considered a success. Unlike China, under 
Gorbachev’s leadership the Soviet Union implemented political liberalization (glasnost) 
more successfully than economic restructuring (perestroika), and experienced economic 
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collapse and political disintegration (Diamond 1995). These examples lead us to believe 
that successful economic reform is easier under an undemocratic government.  
 
Some studies have extended and applied this analysis of the relationship between 
democratization and economic reform to East Asian countries. For example, Pei (1995) 
argued that East Asian countries achieved successful economic reform under autocratic and 
authoritarian rule, unlike most Latin American countries where democratic breakthroughs 
preceded wrenching economic reform. Economic restructuring occurred very gradually in 
East Asia, and economic reform was compatible with three other key developmental goals: 
high growth rates, poverty reduction, and shrinking socioeconomic inequality (Pei 1995, 
114-5).  
 
Skepticism toward democracy’s role in bringing about economic reform might 
seem persuasive, to a certain extent. However, such a vague connection is too simplistic 
and deterministic. There are many other factors that influence the reform process. As 
skeptics have stated, economic reform may indeed be more successful under authoritarian 
regimes. In the short run, the earlier stages of democratization can result in negative 
outcomes that are anathema to reform, such as money politics. The lack of a consensus 
mechanism among diverse interest groups, the lack of appropriate governance mechanisms 
to resolve bureaucratic conflict, and high money politics with increased costs of elections, 
will result in political instability and an impasse for economic reform. However, as 
democracy becomes more stable, its long term effect on reform will be positive. 
Consolidated democracy, such as the development of a political party system, could be a 
basis for resolving conflicts associated with economic reform. 
 
Many studies have suggested that democracy is compatible with economic reform 
and structural adjustment. The success of economic reform is influenced by many 
institutional, historical, and political variables which are independent of regime type. 
Furthermore, democratic institutions, especially a well-developed political party system, 
can facilitate the resolution of social conflicts associated with economic reform (Diamond 
1995). Democratic consolidation, such as establishment of the rule of law and 
accountability of the political system, can be compatible with economic reform. Successful 
economic reform requires the broad support of the public, which would be possible under a 
policy-based political party system.  
 
2. A Theoretical Framework 
 
Meaning of democracy and economic reform in this study 
 
A theoretical framework should provide an explanation of the relationship between 
democracy and economic reform on two levels: whether democratization in Korea and 
Taiwan has led to the reform process in the financial sector and why the transformation 
process is a continuous pattern in some countries and a big-bang pattern in others.  
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Before framing the theory, let us first define the concept of democracy and 
economic reform. Democracy is usually characterized by competitive elections, protection 
of civil and political liberties, and a variety of channels for citizen participation. To 
examine the developmental process of East Asian countries, however, democratization 
should be understood as a “process” rather than a “result.” Most countries are regarded as 
democratic if they simply satisfy the minimum condition of the procedural meaning of 
democracy, which is holding competitive elections not substantial meaning of democracy, 
which promotes equality.3 Korea and Taiwan began a long journey of democratization in 
the late 1980s, but they are still in the process of democratization in terms of consolidating 
and institutionalizing democratic norms and principles.  
 
Economic reform often refers to all policies that promote marketization, 
privatization, and free trade, especially for countries that have experienced fast growth 
under authoritarian regimes. However, the content and direction of economic reform vary 
across time and regions. For example, the external economic shocks of the 1930s resulted 
in heterodox policy experiments, many of which expanded the role of the state in the 
economy. In contrast, in most cases new democratic governments are compelled to 
implement a more or less “orthodox” direction of reform, which includes liberalization by 
reducing the role of the state in the economy and expanding the role of the market. During 
the 1970s and 1980s, debt-burdened economies pursued stabilization and “structural 
adjustment” by converging on a set of principles of sound macroeconomic management. In 
the 1990s many Communist countries had to transform from socialism to capitalism, which 
is an even more daunting task. They had to privatize state enterprises, remove trade 
restrictions, and create capital markets and social insurance systems from scratch.  
 
These various experiences suggest that the contents of economic reform vary 
across time, regions, countries, and even sectors, depending upon the causes of the reform. 
In this study, since we focus on the financial sector before and after the Asian financial 
crisis in Korea and Taiwan, economic reform basically means financial liberalization and 
financial reform with the aim of improving competitiveness and transparency in the 
financial sector. The reform process tries to improve its economy by transforming industrial 
structures and corporate governance.  
 
Additional factors to be considered 
 
To understand the relationship between democracy and economic reform, we need to have 
a broader perspective on this relationship and consider various factors that influence the 
reform process. For example, we need to discard the absolutist position that democracy is 
                                                 
3 The procedural meaning of democracy is characterized as the regular election of president and politicians. 
Dahl (1971) suggests the concept of ‘polyarchy,’ constituted by two conditions such as political contestation 
and participation. Sorenson (1993) developed this procedural meaning of democracy into ‘democratic 
autonomy’ which includes a more substantial meaning of democracy, such as economic equality and social 
participation etc.  
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either positive or negative on economic reform. Democracy can be a positive and negative 
engine for economic liberalization and opening. Also, we should consider path-dependent 
dynamics of reform processes across countries and sectors; in short, past choices constrain 
choices for the future. The institutional legacy in each country will affect different 
challenges and tasks for reform. The sectoral characteristics, pattern of development, and 
historical legacy also affect the reform process. According to the theory of historical 
institutionalism, an institution offers a particular set of opportunities, and actors are 
expected to gravitate toward certain behaviors that take advantage of these opportunities. 
Since institutional structures influence actors’ behaviors, the process of democratization is 
conditioned by institutions and can be different in different countries; therefore the 
transformation process of developmental states under globalization and democratization 
can show path-dependent characteristics (Hall and Soskice 2001; Thelen 1992).  
  
In addition, we need to include coalitional factors in understanding variant 
outcomes across countries and sectors. The choices and outcomes of reform will also be 
influenced by the support or opposition of coalition groups. The effects of reform will 
highlight winners and losers, therefore the support from embedded interest groups or 
shifting coalition group would be followed according to the contents and direction of 
reform. The contents of economic reform could include deregulation such as liberalization, 
and re-regulation such as improvement of transparency, accountability, and so forth. The 
interests of various societal groups will be hurt or benefited by various polices of economic 
reform. When we take these factors into account in attempting to understand the 
relationship between democracy and economic reform, the comparative analysis will be 
more comprehensive and balanced.  
 
The framework 
 
Partly borrowing from Lim’s (1998) coalition theory of industrial transformation and 
considering various factors mentioned above, we suggest the following theoretical 
framework. First, economic reform can be achieved under both democracy and 
authoritarianism. However, a threshold must be overcome. Threshold conditions include a 
close collaboration among industrial sectors, political leaders, and bureaucrats (Lim 1998, 
Ch.2) and the capacity of a given industry group to implement a reform process. Basic 
environmental factors such as market development, institutional quality, and governance 
may also be included in the threshold conditions, but these can be endogenously provided 
as the reform proceeds.  
 
 In order for reform to move forward, coalition groups should have a mutual interest 
in and a motive to reform. For example, the political regime may desire a certain reform in 
order to weaken the power of an existing group and to strengthen a new leadership. A 
business group may also require the reform to strengthen its competitiveness for survival in 
a new environment. And bureaucrats may want the reform because sometimes they stand to 
regain power through the reform process. In such a situation, the collaboration threshold 
can be overcome. However, collaboration is not the only requirement—the ability to 
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achieve the given reform is essential. An economic reform requires not only a strong will 
and mutual interest but also business groups and perhaps bureaucrats who have the capacity 
to implement it.  
 
 Korea’s experience transforming its industrial base from light industry to heavy-
chemical industry (HCI) provides an example of an economic reform under authoritarian 
regime. The new political regime and the newly rising large enterprises (LEs) both showed 
very strong interest in the basic change of the economic structure, and the government 
provided strong support to implement reform through industrial policy. Likewise, 
informatization and the information technology (IT) transformation in Korea and Taiwan 
are examples of economic reform achieved under democratic regimes. Both the 
governments and business groups showed much interest in the transformation in order to 
establish a new growth engine, the existing large enterprises had capital and developed 
technology to enable it.  
 
 
<Figure 1> Theoretical Framework 
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As a country democratizes, pressures from various groups increase and it is 
difficult for the political regime to ignore such pressures, especially when they are strong. 
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Since a reform produces winners and losers, sometimes opposition from the presumed 
losers can be very strong and the reform can be blocked. Also, this kind of political 
pressure can undermine the autonomy and ability of bureaucrats to implement the reform. 
Thus, we also suggest that in a democratic regime, a reform is more likely to proceed in a 
sector where the negative effect on a specific group is not salient.  
 
 For example, most people benefited from reform of the IT sector in Korea and 
Japan, and no specific group was negatively impacted. Thus, IT reform proceeded without 
much resistance in both countries. In contrast, financial reform had the potential to 
negatively affect both existing business groups and bureaucrats. Financial liberalization and 
opening could also negatively affect the poor and widen the income gap, a result of the 
negative impact of globalization. Thus, financial reform was often delayed, which led to 
increasing problems in that sector. When these problems erupted in a crisis as in Korea or 
when the market pressure was too strong as in Taiwan, financial reform was imperative and 
could no longer be put off, so the threshold conditions were met. Since financial reform 
requires a break from past practices, it usually follows a path-breaking and big-bang 
pattern.4  
 
 Table 1 shows a summary of some applications of the above framework to the 
experiences of Korea and Taiwan. According to this table, financial reform in Korea 
basically failed before the crisis, and was path-breaking after the crisis while it is still hard 
to see a noticeable process of financial reform in Taiwan. In the next two sections, we will 
compare financial reform processes in Korea and Taiwan and explain why their reform 
processes are classified as in Table 1.  
 
<Table 1> Patterns of Reforms 
Interest in Reform Capacity of Reform 
Country Industry 
Politics Business Bureaucrat Business Bureaucrat 
Pattern of Reform 
HCI Yes Yes Yes Yes/No Yes Path-breaking 
IT ? Yes Yes Yes Yes Path-dependent 
Finance 1 Yes Yes/No No No ? Non-reform 
Korea 
Finance 2 Yes Yes Yes Yes ? Path-breaking 
HCI Yes No Yes No Yes Reform? 
IT Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Path-dependent Taiwan 
Finance ? No Yes No ? Non-reform 
Note 1: HCI, IT, and Finance respectively mean industrial transformation from light to heavy-chemical in the 
manufacturing sector, informatization and IT industry development, and financial reform.  
Note 2: Finance 1 and Finance 2 respectively mean before and after the crisis.  
Source: Classified using Lim (1998; 2007) 
 
 
                                                 
4 A big-bang pattern can be characterized by huge changes in industrial and governance structures within a 
short time (as opposed to gradual reforms); the reforms enacted by the Thatcher government in the UK are an 
example of big-bang reforms.  
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III. Democratization and Financial Reform in Korea 
 
1. Financial Liberalization and Financial Reform: Delayed and Forced Reform 
 
Financial systems in early periods: developmental banking 
 
It is well known that the Korean government pursued export-oriented industrialization 
beginning in the 1960s. The government targeted strategic industrial sectors over time: light 
manufacturing in the 1960s; HCIs (heavy and chemical industries) in the 1970s; technology 
industries in the 1980s; and IT (information technology) since the 1990s. The government 
intervened in the economy by providing large corporations in these sectors with incentives 
such as import protection, fiscal preferences, and, most importantly, preferential access to 
subsidized credit (so-called policy loans5). The government also influenced the sectoral 
allocation of credit through the appointment of bank management and credit controls. 
These policies resulted in a tightly-controlled, government-administered financial system, 
which is characterized by chronic demand for credit.  
 
The Korean financial system consists of three main types of institutions: 
commercial banks, specialized and development banks, and nonbank financial institutions 
(NBFIs). Before the 1997 financial crisis, commercial banks accounted for over half the 
assets of the financial system. Specialized and development banks were partly or wholly 
owned by the government, which used to provide credit for strategic sectors. NBFIs also 
played a big role in the financial system and were owned mainly by the chaebols (large 
business conglomerates). Most of the thirty merchant banks in 1997 were owned by the 
chaebols, and some were partly owned by foreign banks. Securities companies were also 
owned by the chaebols and acted as dealers for their own accounts.  
 
Commercial banks were nationalized in the early 1960s, when the top eight banks 
accounted for two-thirds of commercial bank assets. Five of these had been providing 
government-directed policy loans over a long period. To reduce the reliance of large 
corporations on bank loans, in the mid-1970s the government began to impose a credit 
control system and develop capital markets. The gradual and partial reform in financial 
system began in the 1980s.  
 
Financial liberalization and reform before the crisis 
 
Financial liberalization refers to deregulation, whereas financial reform includes re-
regulation as well as restructuring, although both terms are often used interchangeably. It is 
widely believed that the main cause of the financial crisis in 1997 was a mismatch between 
too much financial liberalization and too little financial reform (Chang 1998; Weiss and 
Hobson 2000; Lew 2005). To understand this, we need to go back to the 1980s and 
                                                 
5 The borrowing cost differential between protected and unprotected industries was about 2-3 percentage 
points. Lim 1998. Ch. 4.; Balino and Ubide 1999. 
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examine how financial liberalization started in Korea. Woo-Cummings (1997) argues that 
financial liberalization in Korea was triggered by a much larger global process, world 
capitalism, and external pressure from the United States. The story of the 1980s is less a 
story of Korea “reforming” after behaving badly in the past than of adjusting to new 
realities in Washington (Woo-Cumings 1997, 91). Korea might be the case in which 
external factors could explain the process of liberalization and post-crisis reform.  
 
However, overemphasis on the external factor should not overshadow the 
importance of domestic political reform as an important variable in Korea’s financial 
reform, especially when we compare Korea with Taiwan. We cannot but ask why the two 
countries responded differently under similar external pressures and in similar 
environments. Because of differences in domestic politics, the external environment is 
filtered and may have a different effect on different countries. But this does not explain 
away the important role of the external environment as a structural constraint. The 
complementary perspective and more sophisticated job of fleshing out the important 
domestic variable should be done first.  
 
The period of financial liberalization and reform in Korea can be divided into three 
phases. First, the 1980s can be seen as an era of “delayed reform.” Second, the period of the 
Kim Young-sam government (1993-1998) can be considered one of unregulated 
liberalization which sowed the seeds of the 1997 financial crisis. Third, the period 
following the crisis can be regarded as a period of “forced reform.” The characteristics of 
each period in terms of speed, content, and direction of financial liberalization and reform 
in Korea are explained below. 
 
After the death of President Park Chung-hee in 1979, economic reform was largely 
in the area of macroeconomic policies. The agenda known as the “Washington Consensus” 
consisted of a reduction of government deficit, a tight monetary policy, privatization of 
commercial banks, relaxing control over foreign investment, and phasing out of subsidies. 
These reform measures were seen as successful but they did not completely overhaul the 
financial sector.6
 
The first priority of the Chun Doo-hwan regime, which came to power in 1980, 
was to stabilize the overheated economy. To achieve economic stabilization, the 
authoritarian Chun government pushed for a financial liberalization plan consisting of 
privatization of banks, reduction of policy loans, deregulation of bank entry barriers, and 
interest rate liberalization. Some of these policies were implemented—for example, as 
commercial banks were privatized and entry into commercial banking was liberalized, six 
new commercial banks were established between 1980 and 1992, increasing the number of 
                                                 
6 Reform during the Chun Doo-hwan government was prepared by Kim Jae Ik, who was a neo-liberal 
economist trained at Stanford University. Reforms during this period, however, did not change other 
important areas such as corporate governance, reduction of state intervention, etc. Lee et al. 2005, p. 13. 
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commercial banks from 7 in 1985 to 13 in 1992.7 Entry barriers for NBFIs were also 
lowered. Interest rates were partially liberalized, and in 1987 many preferential lending 
rates were abolished. However, the reform of the financial system during the 1980s was 
partial (Balino and Ubide 1999). Most of the reform goals such as interest rate 
liberalization, reduction of policy loans, and foreign exchange liberalization were 
postponed. The developmental characteristics of the state and the cozy relationship between 
the government and the financial sectors continued during the 1980s. 
  
Lew (2005) argues that the nature of reform in the 1980s was “delayed reform.” On 
the other hand, Jang (2003) considers the reform in the 1980s as a positive development, or 
“gradual” liberalization. These two interpretations do not necessarily conflict with one 
another: there was indeed both gradual liberalization and delayed reform during the 1980s. 
However, under the Kim Young-sam government of the 1990s, this process was shifted 
into speedy financial liberalization without the parallel financial reform.  
 
From the early 1990s, the Korean government started to significantly relax its 
control over the financial sector, accelerating financial liberalization. (Chang et al 1998). 
The Kim government announced a five-year financial liberalization plan aimed at interest 
rate deregulation, abolition of policy loans, more managerial autonomy for banks, reduction 
of entry barriers to financial activities, and, most importantly, capital account liberalization 
which Korea’s previous plans for financial liberalization had failed to include (Chang et al 
1998). Foreign borrowing, which traditionally had been very tightly controlled by the 
government, was also liberalized, and the number of merchant banks increased from six in 
1994 to 15 in July 1996. But the Kim government relaxed controls on foreign borrowing 
more than was needed, and, more importantly, the government failed to exercise adequate 
supervision of this borrowing. The merchant banks took full advantage of this absence of 
supervision, and created a severe mismatch in the maturity structure between their 
borrowings (64 percent of the $20 billion total were short term) and lendings (85 percent of 
them long term). 
  
The Kim government also abandoned the traditional approach to exchange rate 
management. The current account surplus of $0.4 billion in 1993 turned into a deficit of 
$4.5 billion in 1994, to $8.9 billion in 1995, and grew to a record $23.7 billion in 1996.8 
There were other incidents such as the collapse of the price of memory chips, a major 
export item for the country. The failure to take timely action to adjust currency 
overvaluation proved fatal when the Japanese yen and Chinese yuan massively depreciated 
beginning 1994.  
 
                                                 
7 For example, during 1981-1987, 12 investment banks, 1 investment trust company, and 57 of mutual credit 
organizations were established. Lew 2005, p. 174. 
8 The Korean government has traditionally taken quick action against currency overvaluation to maintain 
export competitiveness. The shift of policy had to do with the increasing dominance of the monetarist idea in 
the Korean and in the international policy making circles. The Korean government feared that significant 
depreciation would make the foreign debt repayment burden unbearable. Chang. 1998, p.1558. 
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Further, the Kim government abandoned an important tool for developmental 
states: industrial policy, particularly the coordination of investment. The planning ministry, 
the Economic Planning Board (EPB), merged with the Ministry of Finance (MOF), creating 
the super-sized Ministry of Finance and Economy (MOFE), which symbolized the demise 
of “planning” in Korea. This rationalization policy resulted from the rise of a pro-market 
ideology and the loss of legitimacy of centralized coordination (Chang 1998, p.1558). 
There were many examples of the Kim government abandoning the role of investment 
coordination. The government refused to coordinate investments in the petrochemical 
industry despite evidence of massive overcapacity, for example. However, it is well known 
that the government inconsistently allowed Samsung to enter the auto market due to 
political reasons despite evidence of overcapacity. Critics have argued that the Kim Young-
sam government produced a full-blown “crony capitalism.”9  
 
Financial reform after the crisis 
 
The long history of government intervention in bank lending decisions had hindered the 
development of a sound banking system. The Korean economy was dominated by large 
corporations which were highly dependent on borrowing mainly from the banking system. 
The government stood behind the banking system, and it was believed that large 
corporations were too big to fail. This cozy relationship among the government, banks, and 
large corporations was one cause of the crisis. During the 1990s, banks and NBFIs 
increased borrowing in the international financial markets. Weak regulatory and 
supervisory arrangements allowed banks and NBFIs to take excessive risks without 
building a capital base to withstand shocks.  
 
Financed by this lending from banks and NBFIs (especially NBFIs), Korean 
corporations greatly increased investment in new industries between 1994 and 1996. A 
large portion of borrowing was undertaken through overseas subsidiaries and foreign 
branches, especially focusing on short-term capital inflows. Domestic banks channeled 
short term borrowing to finance domestic corporations with long-term loans.  
 
These investments turned out to be unsustainable. The sharp fall in the 
semiconductor market and a decline in foreign demand resulted in substantial losses in the 
exports sector, and the “carry trade” exposed Korea to the risk of a bank crisis.10 The 
collapse of the Thai baht peg in July 1997 and the subsequent spread of the contagion to 
other countries in the region also sent shock waves to Korea. Short-term creditors began to 
                                                 
9 Of course, there existed many cases of huge scandals before this period. As Amsden argues, one of the 
reasons why East Asian countries performed well had to do with the existence of both subsidy and criteria of 
export performance. It prevented Asian countries from degenerating into predatory states like Latin American 
and African countries. Amsden 1989; Lee. 2005. 
10 Short-term foreign borrowing rates were lower than long-term rates and short-term foreign funds could be 
easily raised by international money markets. Balino and Ubide. 1999. pp. 23-25. This ‘carry trade’ exposed 
the country to a risk of bank crisis, for banks would be able to liquidate assets rapidly in case foreign short 
term creditors became concerned about growing trouble in the Korean bank system. 
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withdraw their credit lines, leading Korea to the brink of collapse.  
 
Korea could not but ask the IMF for help and commit to a program of 
macroeconomic adjustment and structural reform through a stand-by arrangement of SDR 
15.5 billion (roughly US$21 billion) from the Fund. The prescribed program of structural 
reform included three goals: to restructure the banking system; to increase the market 
orientation of the financial system and to strengthen the supervision and management to 
prevent a similar crisis from occurring again; and to start a program of corporate 
restructuring, especially to resolve problems of the major chaebols, which is closely related 
with restructuring of the financial sector (Balino and Ubide 1999). As an interim measure, 
the government consolidated all financial sector supervision under a single Financial 
Supervisory Commission (FSC).11 The government also revised the Bank of Korea Act to 
guarantee the central bank’s independence and allow it to focus on price stability.  
 
A year after the restructuring process began, the Korean banking sector became 
more consolidated. Since December 1997, 16 of the 33 commercial banks and 897 of 2070 
NBFIs have either closed or merged (Table 2). In particular, 29 out of 30 merchant banks 
which were heavily blamed for their high exposure to currency and maturity risk have 
closed, and only two, including one new entry, are currently operating. A considerable 
amount of public funds were provided in the process of financial restructuring; the most 
important reform measure was to strengthen the banking environment, including improving 
bank supervision and prudent regulations.  
 
The Korean government almost completely opened its financial market to 
foreigners while simultaneously restructuring the financial sector. As foreigners bought 
distressed Korean financial companies at fire sale prices, most big Korean banks were 
handed over to foreign companies. Among the seven biggest commercial banks in Korea, 
six are owned by foreigners (on average, foreigners’ share is over 80 percent); Woori Bank 
is the only remaining large commercial bank that is majority Korean-owned (Table 3).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
11 Before the crisis, commercial banks were under the direct authority of the Monetary Board (the governing 
body of the Bank of Korea) and the Office of Banking Supervision (OBS), while specialized banks and 
NBFIs were under the authority of Ministry of Finance and Economy. This lack of unified system of 
supervision and regulation created the conditions for regulatory arbitrage and the development of risky 
practices among commercial banks’ trust business and merchant banks. ibid. p. 16. 
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<Table 2> Financial Restructuring after the Crisis 
(unit: number) 
1997 June 2002 June 2007 
 Existing 
number 
Restruct-
uring 
New 
entry 
Current 
number 
Restruct-
uring 
New 
entry 
Current 
number 
BANK 33 14 1 20 2 0 18 
Merchant 
banks 30 28 1 3 1 0 2 
Securities 
companies 36 8 16 44 7 3 40 
Insurance 
companies 50 15 9 44 7 12 49 
Asset 
managements 32 7 8 33 6 22 49 
Mutual savings 
banks 231 126 12 117 12 4 109 
Credit 
institutions 1,666 423 9 1,252 243 6 1,015 
Leasing 
companies 25 10 4 19 4 7 22 
NBFI 
Sub-total 2,070 617 59 1,512 280 54 1,286 
Total 2,103 631 60 1,532 282 54 1,304 
Note: Restructuring means the number additionally reduced by M&A, closures, etc. since the previous period.  
Source: Annual Report of Public Fund Oversight, Korea Public Fund Oversight Committee 
 
 
 
<Table 3> Foreigners’ Share of Commercial Banks 
(unit: %) 
Name 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Kookmin 25.5 50.5 58.2 Kookmin 
Jootaek 45.1 66.4 66.4 
71.1 70.2 73.6 76.1 85.4 
Woori --- 0.05 16.3 0.0 0.7 4.5 11.7 11.4 
Shinhan 27.8 34.2 40.4 48.6 49.0 Shinhan Chohung 5.8 0.4 0.2 0.3 3.1 40.4 62.8 57.1 
Hana 18.1 26.2 32.2 52.0 --- --- --- Hana Seoul 0.2 --- --- --- 28.7 37.2 --- 78.2 
SCfirst 0.1 50.99 50.99 50.99 50.99 48.56 48.56 100 
KEB 34.9 23.0 34.2 34.1 27.9 71.0 72.0 74.2 
Citibank 25.7 30.7 48.6 53.2 61.0 85.8 --- 99.0 
Source: KDI (2007) 
 
Financial reform in Korea can therefore be characterized as delayed, but ultimately 
forced by the Asian financial crisis. The next section explains why the reform process took 
this pattern, how democratization affected the politics of reform, and what other factors 
also could have influenced the process of financial liberalization and reform in Korea.  
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2. Political Economy of the Reform Process 
 
Democratization 
 
As noted above, the idea of political democracy tends to spread into other areas of society, 
and the year 1987 was a turning point in terms of changing the political/economic 
landscape in Korea. The following year, the new Roh Tae-woo government (1988-1993) 
declared that democratization in other areas should go hand in hand with political 
democratization: In particular, the Roh government advocated that liberalization of the 
financial sector should be leveled with the trend of democratization. Roh promised a 
reduction of policy loans, independence for the Central Bank, and rationalization of the 
financial sector. Unfortunately, most of these pledges were postponed due to changes in 
economic conditions such as increasing inflation, the real estate bubble, and the stock 
market crash after 1990. 
 
Political democratization began to have an effect on economic liberalization and 
reform during the Kim Young-sam government, beginning in 1993. The Kim government 
was the first “civilian” government since democratization and tried to push for broad and 
drastic reform in various areas including the military, economy, and politics. (Chang 2003). 
Financial liberalization was one of the most important areas for this drastic economic 
reform. The fast deregulation and liberalization under the Kim government reflected the 
pace of democratization in Korea. As the idea of political democratization spread into the 
economic area, economic democratization was somewhat understood as market 
liberalization and financial liberalization (Chang 2007).12 As a reaction to the past 
authoritarian rule, the democratization in the economic area meant the reduction of state 
intervention, deregulation, and liberalization in the financial sector as well.  
 
Such democratization complicated governance in Korea. The autonomy and 
efficiency of technocratic bureaucrats was gradually weakened. As a plan of government 
administrative rationalization, the merger of the EPB with the MOF, creating the MOFE, 
reflected the demise of “central planning” and centralized coordination. Democratization 
reduced the willingness and capacity of the state to implement a coordinated investment 
policy. 
 
Democratization increased various voices in the debate about reform in the 
legislature. In the late 1990s, the lack of consensus among parties in the legislature and the 
divided government (in the presidential system) led to the failure of many reform 
measures.13 The political structure at that time was unstable: Kim Dae-jung’s ruling 
                                                 
12 Political democratization affected the democratization of the economic sector. However, economic 
democratization was understood as the primacy of the market, created by reducing the role of the state in the 
economy. Korea’s experienced with authoritarian governments created a belief that market primacy meant 
economic democratization. Chang, Ha Joon. 2007 Discussion in Pressian. 
13 For example, the “big bang” plan in January 1997 was aborted due to political disputes. The moral authority 
of Kim Young-sam was lost due to a labor fiasco and the Hanbo scandal over corruption, etc. Lee. 2005. p. 28. 
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Millennium Democratic Party did not win a legislative majority in the April 2000 general 
election, and it was allied with Kim Jong-pil’s United Liberal Democrats against the big 
opposition party (the Grand National Party). This made it difficult to reach an agreement on 
reform. In addition, Korea’s limit of one five-year term for presidents created an early 
“lame-duck phenomenon” which could diminish reform efforts (Kim 2000, pp. 156-7). 
Korean party politics after democratization have been fluid and unstable. Political parties 
have been weak, divided along regional lines, and organized around cliques. Conflict 
between the legislature and the president has been frequent. This is typical of democratized 
developing countries, and political constraints on reform. 
 
On the other hand, democratization strengthened the political and economic power 
of the chaebols.14 Due to the high cost of national election campaigns, politicians and 
political parties turned to the chaebols for funds. The government’s attitude and behavior 
toward the chaebols thus swung from one of confrontation to cooperation with impending 
elections, especially when the economy faltered in 1997. Democratization thus created an 
ambivalent relationship between the government and the corporations.  
 
Coalitional factors 
 
With democratization in the late 1980s, diverse interest groups such as NGOs, labor unions, 
intellectuals, and the media organized to pursue their parochial interests at the expense of 
the overall goal of growth. With the rise of these new groups, the power of the technocratic 
bureaucrats declined. Despite some liberalization in the 1980s, the government continued 
an overly cozy relationship with the banks and still influenced the banks through 
appointments of bank directors and personnel. With democratization, however, the 
chaebols became powerful enough to influence the direction of economic policy.  
 
Democratization therefore affected domestic coalitional politics. It was not external 
pressure but internal conflict among various groups that determined the content and speed 
of financial liberalization during the 1980s. The slow and slouching process of reform 
during the 1980s had to do with the preferences of domestic interest groups.  
 
Based on the interest centered perspective, there were two reasons for sluggish 
financial liberalization during the 1980s. First, the chaebols, despite the general preference 
for liberalization in the financial sector, were not ready to give up the privileges derived 
from the triangle relationship among the government, the financial sector, and the industry. 
In fact, the chaebols were of two minds on the issue of liberalization. On the one hand, they 
wanted to keep the protection and support of the government. Because the chaebols were 
fearful of the heavier burden of market-determined interest rates (which would probably be 
higher), they had reason to oppose financial liberalization (Lee et al. 2005, p.14). On the 
other hand, since the chaebols had begun to own their own NBFIs, they desired further 
                                                 
14 Regular election increased the election costs. This must be one of the reasons for the continuing connection 
between the government and corporations. Noble and Ravenhill. 2000, p. 100.  
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financial liberalization. The competing interests of the chaebols hindered the full 
implementation Chun Doo-hwan’s liberalization policy.  
 
Second, the government could not relinquish its control of the financial sector, 
which could have been an important vehicle for industrial restructuring. There existed a 
conflict of interest between neo-liberals and developmental bureaucrats, which was one of 
the causes of the partial and delayed reform (Lew 2005). Developmental bureaucrats 
opposed reform for fear of losing their discretionary power, whereas neo-liberals supported 
reform to propel liberalization forward. The financial liberalization during the 1980s was 
therefore slow, slouching, and fragmented and the financial system remained tightly 
controlled until the early 1990s.  
 
Why did the pace of liberalization accelerate during the 1990s? During the 1990s, 
the chaebols wanted much progress in interest-rate deregulation as they saw an advantage 
in having free NBFIs and thus freer access to credit. Short-term interest rates such as the 
rates on commercial paper available to NBFIs were deregulated first, in a speedy manner, 
while the deposit rates of commercial banks remained under government control.15 Also 
there was pressure for liberalization from foreign capitals that saw profitable opportunities 
in investing in Korea’s booming economy. In the 1990s, therefore, the power of the 
chaebols further increased whereas that of the government further decreased.  
 
Despite the drag that this institutional realignment had on reform, the financial 
crisis of 1997 was a catalyst for comprehensive reform on all fronts—financial, corporate, 
and labor. In dealing with the crisis, the Kim Dae-jung government (1998-2003) followed a 
neoliberal,program.16 Pressure from the U.S. and the IMF were conditionally used as a 
legitimate demand for sacrifice in all sectors of Korea. There was support among various 
sectors for coalitional reasons. The conservative sectors could not but support the reform 
package which would put Korea on the conservative and neoliberal track of economic 
adjustment, despite the deep mistrust of Kim Dae-jung for his progressive ideology. 
President Kim and the labor sector were close to each other in terms of ideology, so he was 
able to overcome the labor sector’s resistance to the neoliberal program. Due to a profound 
sense of a national crisis, Kim Dae-jung escaped criticism from various sectors for his 
reform policies.17 In addition, the state bureaucracy recognized that the financial crisis 
would empower it to restructure banks and corporations, and therefore supported the 
measures. Also, a huge inflow of foreign capital aided in implementing the reform, 
complementing the role of old financial institutions devastated by the crisis. The post-crisis 
reform led to a V-shaped recovery and was regarded as successful during the Kim Dae-jung 
                                                 
15 All restrictions on interest rates for NBFIs’ commercial papers and the amount they could issue were 
removed while restrictions on interest rates on commercial banks loans remained. Lee et all 2005, p.14. 
16 Neoliberal economic reform often refers to all policies that promote marketization, privatization, and free 
trade under the general ambit of the Washington Consensus. 
17 A poll by Gallup Korea reported a public approval rating of 70.7 percent for Kim Dae-jung’s performance 
in office in April 1998, an increase of 17.3 percent points from January - despite the layoff of half a million 
workers since January. Lee et al 2005. p. 18. 
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government, although it is still debatable whether the original goals were accomplished.  
 
In sum, democratization affected the spread of ideas of liberalization in the 
financial sector, which eventually resulted in unregulated liberalization and the financial 
crisis in 1997. Democratization also led to bureaucratic restructuring, which was a signal of 
the demise of industrial policy and coordination. However, the state bureaucracy regained 
power in the middle of financial restructuring, whereas the crisis made the state weak in 
dealing with external actors such as the IMF.  
 
Are there any effects of money politics on elections after democratization in 
Korea? The overly cozy relationship among the government, banks, and corporations had 
existed before democratization. This relationship began to change and became ambivalent 
after democratization. The chaebols became more powerful after they began to own NBFIs 
in the 1980s. Globalization opened a way for the chaebols to finance their business ventures 
by directly borrowing from abroad and to escape from government regulation. Financial 
reform often reflected chaebols’ interests before the crisis. However, the crisis resulted in a 
structural reform in the financial sector without big objections, although the severity and 
magnitude of the reform costs were huge. The crisis was a catalyst for change, which 
provided Korea with both opportunities and challenges.  
 
 
IV. Democratization and Financial Reform in Taiwan 
 
1. Financial Liberalization and Financial Reform: Slow Liberalization and Stalemated 
Reform 
 
The financial system in the early period: bureaucratic banking 
 
The financial system in Taiwan is regarded as underdeveloped, compared to other sectors in 
that country. As The Economist described the situation in 1995, “The island’s economy is 
state-of-the-art, the politics is turned from totalitarian to liberal. However, Taiwan’s 
banking system is still medieval” (The Economist 1995). Many state-owned banks were 
often used by local politicians as vote-buying machines (Sato 2002), and the banking 
system was in need of repair.  
 
The arrested development of the financial system is attributable to the historical 
legacy of the Taiwanese state. Taiwan’s small and open economy made it vulnerable to 
instability and manipulation by its much larger neighbor, mainland China. Taiwan’s 
diplomatic isolation meant that it could not expect help from the IMF or the U.S. The ruling 
party (the Kuomintang, or KMT) also feared inflation and financial impropriety which had 
destroyed its political base during the civil war in the 1940s. This legacy of Taiwan history 
led to a strong policy priority for macroeconomic stability. The KMT sacrificed growth in 
favor of stability in the period of the oil-shocks and tried to control inflation (Noble and 
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Ravenhill 2000, p.102). Taiwan also placed restrictions on the overseas activities of local 
financial institutions. As the Asian financial crisis approached, these regulations on and 
supervision of financial institutions’ overseas investments made Taiwan less vulnerable to 
the financial crisis than was the case in Korea.  
 
The ruling KMT was very well organized and autonomous. The KMT of the 
authoritarian period can be referred to as a “quasi-Leninist” party. Taiwan had virtually no 
national elections until the 1990s, whereas Korea has held national elections since the 
Korean War. Taiwan used party-owned enterprises to supervise local politicians and 
factions. In a sense, the KMT was stronger domestically than were the ruling parties in 
Korea. The features of the Taiwanese financial system could be characterized as follows: 
extensive government and KMT ownership of financial institutions; and heavy-handed 
government regulation of the banking system in terms of entry, pricing, product offerings, 
and financial dualism (Bruck and Sun 2007). As a result of KMT interference in the formal 
financial system, informal financial institutions thrived and provided significant amounts of 
capital to small- and medium-sized enterprises.  
 
In order to manage its financial sector, Taiwan developed the autonomous Central 
Bank of Republic of China (CBC). Central regulators such as the CBC and Ministry of 
Finance (MOF) were widely respected and immune from political pressures. Taiwan’s 
central and provincial governments provided prudent oversight, and, unlike in Korea, banks 
were not aggressive. However, local financial institutions, especially community and 
agricultural credit cooperatives, had been plagued by endemic problems of inefficiency, 
incompetence, and politicization (Noble and Ravenhill 2000, p.96). Despite these problems, 
in general, the rigidities in the financial system of Taiwan provided structural support for 
economic development from 1956 to 1980. High interest rates and a strictly controlled 
banking sector served to augment national savings rates,18 which allowed rapid growth 
without foreign borrowing. But the oligopolistic nature of the banking sector contained 
dangerous inefficiencies. For example, the 1986 relaxation of currency convertibility 
restrictions and surplus export earnings during the 1980s resulted in the speculation bubble 
and stock market crash in early 1990. A series of financial instabilities and crises led the 
government to seriously consider financial liberalization and reform.  
 
Financial liberalization and reform since the late 1980s 
 
In the late 1980s, Taiwan faced a series of macroeconomic crises. The New Taiwan dollar 
had appreciated sharply, severely harming export competitiveness. The supply of labor was 
tightening, causing a debilitating rise in wages and rents. (The typical response was to 
relocate industries off the island, a trend which intensified between 1988 and 1990.) A 
speculative bubble developed between 1986 and 1989, fueled by high liquidity, low interest 
rates, and a lack of incentives to invest productively (Green 1998). The government tried to 
                                                 
18 During the 1956-80 period, gross domestic capital formation averaged 28.4 percent of GNP while in the 
1970s, and net savings to net national product ratios ran at average 30.5 percent. Green 1998, p.8. 
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respond by tightening credit, reforming the financial sector, and adhering to a tight supply-
side monetary policy. However, this attempt at reform was impeded by a bureaucratic 
conflict between the MOF and the CBC. The MOF pushed for free-market and financial 
liberalization, but the central bank was committed to low-inflation and pursued a policy of 
deterring speculation. Also, the MOF plan for reform also was resisted by the Provincial 
Assembly.19  
 
The “Big Bang” of 1991 was a result of deregulation and liberalization, which were 
the catchwords of the day. In 1989 the government began to liberalize the financial sector 
by relaxing restrictions and approving the entry of 15 private commercial banks into the 
market in 1991. The original plan was to issue 6 new bank licenses, but the government 
was forced to issue 15 due to the influence of large businesses (Green 1998). This reform 
increased competition among the struggling banks (Kao 2003).  
 
During the 1990s, the Taiwanese financial system became very unstable under the 
weight of an increasing number of overdue loans.20 There existed two reasons for this 
increasing trend of overdue loans. First, many firms tried to diversify investment to 
overcome a slow economy that had been the result of changes in the industrial sector in the 
late 1980s, but these efforts resulted in many non-performing loans (NPLs). The second, 
and related, reason was the inappropriate lending practices on the part of the financial 
institutions; loans to the real estate industry and loans for speculation in stocks were 
especially problematic.  
 
Financial reform after the crisis 
 
Despite this instability in the financial system, Taiwan was insulated from the 1997-1998 
financial crisis and emerged unscathed. The CBC attributed this to the fact that Taiwan had 
not recklessly liberalized its financial system—as other Asian countries had—and tried to 
turn back the clock by going backward in the process of liberalization and reform. Most 
notably, the central bank and the Financial Supervisory Commission adopted a series of 
measures to slow down the growth of foreign-owned businesses in Taiwan (Taiwan 
Business Topics 2007 July, p.6).  
 
The fact that Taiwan was able to weather the Asian crisis may indicate that the 
Taiwanese financial system performed comparatively well before the crisis. This success 
could be attributed to seemingly superior banking regulation and supervision practices. 
Also, the slow pace of liberalization since the late 1980s seemed to have been a good 
choice. However, problems in the financial sector began to emerge in the late 1990s. 
                                                 
19 In 1991, the MOF unilaterally cut its stake in the banks, but the Provincial Assembly resisted reform. As the 
primary shareholder, the Provincial Assembly regarded the banks not only as a source of income but also a 
lever for patronage. Green ibid, p. 9. 
20 Overdue loans are a category of non-performing loans (NPLs). Taiwanese financial authorities define them 
as loans having nonpayment of interest for six months and nonpayment of principal for three months. Sato 
2002, p.229. 
Haeran Lim 
Democratization and Transformation in Korea and Taiwan 
CNAPS Visiting Fellow Working Paper 
22
Industrial relocation to China, falling domestic stock and real estate markets, and falling 
export demand reduced growth and led to rising unemployment and NPL ratios. However, 
since Taiwan suffered less than its neighbors during the financial crisis itself, the necessity 
of financial reform was felt less urgent. It is believed that Korea’s financial sector gained a 
new life since the Korean government implemented a series of drastic measures under the 
supervision of the IMF. The fortune which made Taiwan escape from the crisis, however, 
became a constraint for future reform. Soon, Taiwan would be hit by the aftershocks of the 
Asian financial crisis, and a wave of bankruptcies extended to the financial sector. 
 
After the crisis, Taiwan’s financial sector began to show symptoms similar to those 
in Korea and Japan during the 1990s. For example, as the MOF recognized, the overall 
NPL ratio climbed from 3 percent in 1995 to 8.78 percent in March 2002, representing an 
increase in bad debt of NT$351.5 billion to $1.4 trillion. The major offenders were the 
grassroots credit cooperatives such as farmers’ and fishermen’s associations which had 
nonperforming loans at 18.5 percent in 2001. In 2001, Taiwan’s economic growth rate 
dropped from the previous year’s 5.0 percent to 2.18 percent, marking the slowest growth 
in a decade (Kao 2003). One reason for this high NPL ratio is that there were too many 
banks, and the cutthroat competition impaired their ability to increase profits. In 2001, 
Taiwan had 53 banks, more than 30 insurance companies, and more than 300 other types of 
financial institutions21 (see Table 4 and Figure 2, below). One of the principle causes of the 
overcrowding was the numerous regulations that prevented banks from diversifying or 
becoming too large. 
 
With impetus from the market, the restructuring of the banking sector became the 
top priority of the government in 2000. As local companies grew in size, financial 
institutions followed suit. In 2001, a package of six financial laws had passed in the 
Legislative Yuan (LY), such as the Financial Holding Company Law (FHCL), the Finance 
Bills Supervisory Law, and the Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC) Statute for setting up 
and managing a NT$140 billion Financial Reconstruction Fund which was designed to 
clean up bad loans in the grassroots financial organizations. After the FHCL, banks, 
insurance companies, and securities companies were permitted to operate under one roof. 
Tax breaks also encouraged companies engaged in different financial services to 
consolidate. Since then, 14 financial holding companies have been established. The FHCL 
allowed foreign holding companies to invest in local financial institutions up to 100 percent 
of their own operations (Chung 2003). This seemed to contribute to positive development 
in sound supervision. However, Taiwan’s holding companies were still in the early stages 
of development and size did not guarantee competitiveness. The MOF expected that local 
banks could reduce their NPL ratio to below 5 percent and raise their capital-adequacy ratio 
to meet the minimum Bank of International Settlements’ standard of 8 percent within two 
years.  
 
                                                 
21 Most banks held less than 2-3 percent of market share and their margins were shrinking dramatically over 
the past few years. Pao 2001. 
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In 2004, Taiwan was still regarded as Asia’s most over-banked market (Table 4), 
with 49 domestic banks, 14 financial holding companies, and over 300 rural credit co-
operatives to serve a population of just 23 million. As banks’ average return on equity went 
down to around 8 percent, the lowest rate in Asia, bank reform began to gain momentum. 
One of the goals was to create a handful of large financial groups that could compete 
regionally and globally by changing regulations that made hostile takeovers and mergers 
difficult. In 2004, President Chen Shui-bian launched a second round of financial reform. 
He sought to speed reform by outlining an ambitious agenda to cut the number of state 
banks by half to six by the end of 2004 and eventually to create three institutions with 
market shares of at least 10 percent, and to reduce the number of financial holding 
companies to seven by the end of 2006.22  
 
 
<Table 4> Number of Financial Institutions in Taiwan 
(unit: number) 
 1994 1998 2002 2007 
Domestic Banks 42 48 52 39 
Local Branches of Foreign Banks 37 46 36 32 
Credit Cooperatives 74 54 37 27 
Farmer’s Association 285 287 253 261 
Fisherman’s Association 27 27 25 25 
Trust and Investment Companies 6 4 3 1 
Bills Finance Companies 3 16 14 12 
Postal Savings System 1 1 1 1 
Source: Financial Statistics Monthly, Central Bank of Republic of China (Taiwan) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
<Figure 2> Number of Bank Branches per 10,000 people (2003) 
                                                 
22 The top five lenders account for 35 percent of the market, versus 60-80 percent in most developed countries. 
The Economist 2005. 
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This initiative failed, for several reasons. First, the government tried to insist on 
controlling every aspect of consolidation rather than allow the market to decide the number 
and timing of deals. The government set numerical targets for bank mergers, which led 
inevitably to bad mergers. The government also banned new branch openings and 
demanded the closing of financial holding companies even though most were healthy. 
Second, the government was weak and failed to persuade the public, the bank unions, and 
the legislature of the need for reform. Due to union pressures and huge protests, the 
government halted the takeover of the ailing state-owned Taiwan Business Bank. Also the 
government overpriced its shares for fear of accusations of selling state assets too cheaply, 
but the resulting high prices deterred foreigners from buying Taiwanese banks (The 
Economist 2005). 
  
In the second half of 2005, Taiwan experienced an unsecure lending crisis 
(resulting from overuse of personal credit and debit cards by consumers), called a “twin 
card” crisis.23 Bank losses from the twin card debt crisis reached almost $3 billion in 2006, 
with hundreds of thousands of Taiwanese people unable to pay off their debts. It was much 
easier for banks to engage in consumer financing was much easier than corporate financing: 
the loans were smaller, the risk was lower, and the interest rate was higher, which made it 
easier to reap profits in the short term. As a result, the scale of the credit card and cash card 
business grew by a factor of four in six years. The FSC worked with the Bankers 
                                                 
23 In a highly fragmented market (around 50 banks issue credit cards and 25 issue cash cards), the only way 
for banks to operate on economies of scale was to issue as many cards as possible. As a result, card debt 
became highest in Q3 2005 and cardholders began defaulting on their debts. www.lafferty.com. 
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Association to create a system for the banks to negotiate with problematic card holders on a 
repayment schedule. Some legislators and financial specialists suggested that Taiwan 
should establish a mechanism for personal bankruptcy (Taiwan Business Topics 2006 July, 
p.50).  
 
Even in 2007, Taiwan was still over-banked, with 39 domestic banks and 14 
locally registered foreign lenders. The number of domestic banks decreased from the peak 
of 53 in 2001, but is still far more per capita than in most major economies. Korea, with 
just over twice Taiwan’s population, has brought down the number of banks to 18 since the 
1997-1998 crisis, and there are but a handful of banks in Canada, Australia, and Singapore. 
More important than the number of domestic banks is the lack of differentiation among 
these banks. Most banks go after the same hot market segment, from corporate loans to 
credit cards and cash cards to wealth management to residential mortgage lending. This 
trend-following indicates a risk of speculative fervor and the development of a bubble, 
which created the credit card crisis. The plan of creating a small number of powerful, 
privately-run lenders has not been successful yet, as most domestic banks are unlikely to 
sell to larger domestic or foreign rivals.24 Mergers between larger private banks or 
acquisitions of state-run lenders by private banks remain impracticable for political reasons. 
Many private banks are affiliated with either the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) or the 
KMT. Mergers between banks with different political affiliations sometimes occurs, but it 
does not stop political infighting. Also, the continued recalcitrance of unions, fearful of job 
losses, has been one of the biggest obstacles to establishing innovative private banks to take 
over state-run banks in Taiwan.  
 
2. Political Economy of the Reform Process 
 
Democratization 
 
The success of the East Asian newly industrialized countries (NICs) could be attributed to 
politically insulated, powerful bureaucracies that steer industrial policy and developmental 
strategy. The KMT insulated the mechanism for bureaucratic planning and budgeting for 
economic development from legislative politics. However, democratization weakened the 
KMT’s dominance in the Legislative Yuan (LY) and eroded the autonomy of the 
bureaucracy managing the economy. First, democratization increased the LY’s power of 
oversight of the bureaucracy. In the post-Asian crisis period, the DPP, the New Party, and 
the KMT emerged as the three major legislative forces, which determined legislative 
outcomes. For example, the New Party cast a decisive swing vote on the passage of a 
sweeping Financial Disclosure Law, which reflected the importance of coalitional politics 
in the LY (Tan 2000).  
 
Second, like in Korea, democratization increased the pressure of interest groups on 
                                                 
24 Leahy (2007) makes the argument that family owners are reluctant to sell as they want to own their bank 
and see their name on the building. 
Haeran Lim 
Democratization and Transformation in Korea and Taiwan 
CNAPS Visiting Fellow Working Paper 
26
the bureaucracy. Regular elections increased the necessity of financing elections by the 
politicians, which resulted in the development of extensive electoral networks between 
politicians and business groups or special interest groups. With Taiwan’s prosperity and its 
transition to democracy, the new problem of money politics emerged. As a new party 
without an endowment, the DPP initiated an aggressive campaign to raise money for 
elections. Sometimes this was done by illegal means. For example, in one local election, 
100 candidates were charged with illegal vote-buying (Pye 1997, 223). Money politics 
seemed to be rampant at the national level as well. As in all democratic politics, 
competitive elections require money and votes to succeed. Democratization weakened the 
KMT’s control of the electoral process and changed the nature of the traditional patron-
client relationship in Taiwan politics. With increasing wealth and autonomy, local 
politicians, factional leaders, and powerful clans emerged as political brokers from whom 
the political parties ask for financial support and votes. Former clients became “equal 
partners” in interactions with their former patrons. Since the 1991 National Assembly 
election, the influence of factions and money politics worsened.25 A dysfunctional 
bureaucracy had been captured by business, crippled by electoral competition and 
corruption, and became inefficient in planning. In this case, politicians reigned, but 
business ruled (Green 1998, p.4).  
 
Democratization also increased the voice of various societal groups, further 
reducing the autonomy of the bureaucracy. The ability to steer economic development has 
been challenged by increasing grassroots participation in the political process. A six-year 
plan to develop an economy sustainable for long-term growth also failed to get public 
support and the endorsement of elected local legislators. Many lawmakers and public 
activists criticized the plan for its lack of transparency, low cost-effectiveness, and poor 
implementation. Facing strong public opposition and inadequacy of planning, the Council 
for Economic Planning and Development (CEPD) had to scale back its original six-year 
plan in 1993 (Tan 2000).  
 
The short-term effect of democratization on financial reform was negative in that 
lack of consensus among parties in the LY, divided government, and money politics foiled 
several reform efforts in the financial sector. However, the LY has taken steps to reform 
itself, changing the electoral system from large multiseat-districts to single member districts 
and downsizing itself through the January 2008 election. (Taiwan Business Topics 2006, 
Feb). The most important foundation for successful economic reform may be the political 
reform, and reform in LY should be an important development for further financial reform 
in Taiwan. The long-term effect of democratization in Taiwan, however, remains to be seen 
and its effect on the reform process should be reexamined in the future.  
 
Coalitional factors 
                                                 
25 For example, legislator Oung Da-ming, a business tycoon, was charged in Oct. 1994 with stock market 
manipulation. It was widely reported that other legislators either had received political contributions from 
Oung or had entrusted money to him in stock transactions. Kau 1996, pp.300-303. 
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Democratization increased the opportunities for diverse societal groups to support or 
oppose certain reform policies. Despite the general consensus on the need for reform, not 
everyone is ready to swallow the bitter medicine. In November 2002, farmers and 
fisherman, worried about the possibility of cutting off their primary sources of credit, 
protested against the MOF’s plan to reform their local credit unions, especially the 
introduction of oversight mechanisms to reduce high NPL ratios.26 An agricultural finance 
bill was postponed due to domestic protest (Kao 2003), and the government suspended its 
measures and vowed to devise a more feasible approach.  
 
One of Taiwan’s most serious obstacles to financial reform is the entrenched 
position of the state-owned banks, which account for about half of the market share in 
terms of assets (Figure 3, below). The long monopoly by inefficient state-owned banks has 
had a negative effect on the economy. One of the reforms proposed in the financial sector 
was to privatize the state-owned banks. However, the reform was not easy, partly because 
of domestic opposition from labor unions. The labor unions have fought to resist 
privatization and their efforts successfully blocked an attempted divestiture of the Taiwan 
Business Bank, as noted above (Taiwan Business Topics 2007, April 22). Other factors also 
discouraged the process of privatization including public discomfort over the growing 
concentration of wealth in the hands of a few business group, and the intense and unending 
conflict between the pan-green and the pan-blue camps. The issue of privatization has 
become so sensitive that each side criticizes and accuses the other of political favoritism; it 
is therefore especially costly for politicians to push privatization during the election 
campaigns. As a result, the government has backed off from the original plans of reducing 
the numbers of financial groups and state-owned banks. Instead the FSC has shifted 
emphasis to the improvement of corporate governance in various industries.27
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
<Figure 3> Share of Banking Assets 
                                                 
26 The government imposed a three-tier risk-control measure to prohibit credit unions with an NPL ratio 10 
percent from accepting deposits from non-members. It also banned lenders with NPL ratios of between 15 
percent and 25 percent from granting loans of more than NT $3 million to sponsoring members who are not 
farmers or fishermen. Also, the government instructed 10 state-run banks to take over 36 debt-ridden 
associations between August and October in 2001. Her. 2003. 
27 Taiwan Business Topics 2007. 37(4), p.23.  
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But democratization not only increases the voice of the opponents of reform, it also 
gives voice to supporters. The variables of democratization and coalitional politics are 
somewhat necessarily related. However, these two variables are different in terms of 
explaining the final policy outcome. Democratization cannot predict specific outcomes of 
reform policies. Inclusion of an interest-centered variable into this analysis will improve 
our complete understanding of the specific policy outcome. The case of the 2001 Financial 
Holding Company Law (FHCL) could explain this aspect well. According to Bruck and 
Sun (2007), the FHCL was passed despite a deadlock between the DPP executive and the 
pan-blue dominated LY.28 There existed voices from civil society and mass media arguing 
that the interests of the Taiwanese people would not be served if the FHCL was not passed. 
The pan-blue legislators feared that their opposition to the DPP government’s initiative 
might negatively affect their electoral prospects. Eventually, therefore, legislators in the LY, 
whether they belonged to DPP, KMT, People First Party, or New Party, came to view the 
                                                 
28 Initially, it seemed that the pan-blue camp would exploit its leverage and deny the DPP passage of the 
FHCK. However, they were worried about their long-term reputation on future elections. Bruck and Sun 2007.  
Haeran Lim 
Democratization and Transformation in Korea and Taiwan 
CNAPS Visiting Fellow Working Paper 
29
FHCL positively and thought that it would aid troubled local banks. Taiwan’s executive 
and financial bureaucrats also favored the FHCL, which they believed promised better 
banking and economic transparency and would upgrade regulatory capabilities. Finally, 
private business groups were strongly in favor of banking deregulation, and consumers 
could benefit by decreasing transaction costs. The case of the FHCL, therefore, illustrates 
how the interest-centered analysis helps us to understand why democratization can have a 
beneficial effect on the politics of financial reform. The divided government and a lack of 
consensus among political parties could be overcome by the role of civil society, media, 
and rational politicians. The increasing potential for involvement of interest groups in 
policy-making process can be labeled as “benign capture” of the state (Bruck and Sun 2007, 
678).  
 
Although partial financial reform has been achieved, progress in this area in 
Taiwan is regarded as slow and stalemated, compared to the reform process in other 
countries such as Korea. 
 
 
V. Conclusion: Summary and Implications 
 
This study analyzes the impact of democracy on financial reform in Korea and Taiwan. It is 
often argued that democratic systems are at a disadvantage in achieving economic reform, 
and the contrasting experiences of China and Russia are often cited as proof that economic 
reform requires an involved and autocratic regime. But experience indicates that economic 
reform is not easy under either an authoritarian or a democratic regime. Indeed, reform 
processes are affected by many variables such as the role of technocrats, institutional 
legacies, and coalitional politics, as well as democratization. Some argue that East Asian 
developmental states succeeded in economic reform under the authoritarian regimes, but 
this is inaccurate. In fact, Korea and Taiwan began the process of economic reform after 
democratization and, in particular, after the financial crisis in 1997.  
 
Korea and Taiwan have shared many common characteristics such as the 
experience of economic growth under an authoritarian regime and democratic transition 
after economic development. Despite their similarities, we find that their responses to 
globalization and the 1997-1998 financial crisis are saliently different and that they have 
taken different paths of reform, which resulted in different outcomes in their financial 
reform efforts.  
 
 The pattern of financial liberalization and reform can be categorized as “fast 
liberalization, delayed reform, and forced reform” in Korea. The political power of the 
chaebols in Korea was strengthened immediately following democratization because 
political parties needed financial support due to the increased costs of elections. In contrast, 
democratization decreased the autonomy and efficiency of the bureaucracy because the 
legitimacy of centralized coordination was weakened. The beginning of financial 
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liberalization in the 1980s reflected the influence of the chaebols. Entry barriers for 
nonbank financial institutions (NBFIs) were lowered in the 1980s and the chaebols became 
more influential in the financial sector by controlling their own NBFIs. However, the 
chaebols showed ambivalence towards financial liberalization and reform. The chaebols 
wanted financial liberalization in order to create easy access to credit through their NBFIs 
and to reduce dependence on the government. While calling for fast deregulation, the 
chaebols at the same time wanted to retain the protection and support from the government 
that benefitted them. Democratization gave business more leverage over the state by 
extending the web of money politics to opposition politicians. During the 1990s, cronyism 
became rampant. Democratization did not end money politics and the cozy relationship 
between politicians and businesses, making reform of the financial sector more difficult. 
The negative aspects of democratization on the reform process during the 1980s and 1990s 
precipitated the financial crisis in 1997.  
 
 After the crisis, Korea committed to a program of macroeconomic adjustment and 
structural reform. Within one year, 7 of the 26 commercial banks and 16 of the 30 merchant 
banks were either closed or merged. The crisis was a catalyst for change. The crisis 
empowered the bureaucracy to restructure banks and corporations. The Kim Dae-jung 
government steered away from the previous government’s pro-chaebol policy to accelerate 
economic reform. Conditions for drastic reform were favorable: the urgency of the reform, 
weakening veto power of both businesses and labor unions, change of political leadership, 
the people’s willingness to share the burden of the crisis, strong IMF pressure for reform, 
public association of the chaebols with the crisis, and a strengthened bureaucracy. A 
coalition of many sectors of state and society pushed the reform. The Korean case is a 
successful case of “path-breaking” reform (nature of discontinuity and big-bang change).  
 
The nature and pattern of financial liberalization and reform in Taiwan, on the 
other hand, is characterized as “slow and gradual liberalization and stalemated reform.” 
Taiwan’s history and national identity provided the country with structural constraints 
which emphasized macroeconomic stability and led to conservative policies in financial 
institutions. Structural constraints allowed the Taiwanese authorities continue to closely 
regulate the financial system until the late 1980s, when democratization and economic 
development, as well as globalization, provided pressure for financial liberalization and 
reform in Taiwan. Slow liberalization began in the late 1980s and the Taiwanese banking 
system seemed to work well during the 1990s as Taiwan emerged unscathed from the Asian 
financial crisis in 1997. 
 
However, this success, although it can be traced in part back to the seemingly rigid 
banking regulations, became an obstacle for financial reform. There was no sense of 
urgency, as there was in Korea. Furthermore, democratization increased the effect of 
money politics, increased the voices of domestic interest groups such as labor unions and 
local groups, and weakened bureaucratic autonomy and governance. These developments 
foiled attempts at reform in the public banking sector. The effect of democratization, in the 
short term, has been negative due to divided government, an unstable political party system, 
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and lack of consensus among parties in the Legislative Yuan. However, in the long run, as 
Taiwan’s democracy matures, democratization will have a positive effect on reforming the 
financial sector.  
 
Haeran Lim 
Democratization and Transformation in Korea and Taiwan 
CNAPS Visiting Fellow Working Paper 
32
Bibliography 
 
Abe, Makoto, Yukihito Sato and Mamoru Nagano. Economic Crisis and Korea/Taiwan. 
Institute of Developing Economies. IDE-JETRO. TOKYO. 1999. 
 
Ahn, Choong Yong. “Financial and Corporate Sector Restructuring in South Korea: 
Accomplishments and Unfinished Agenda,” The Japanese Economic Review, 52(4), 
December 2001. 
 
Amsden, Alice H. Asia's Next Giant: South Korea and Late Industrialization. New York: 
Oxford University Press. 1989.  
 
Balino, Tomas J. T. and Angel Ubide. “The Korean Financial Crisis of 1997- A Strategy of 
Financial Sector Reform,” IMF Working Paper. 1999. 
 
Bates, Robert. ed. "Governments and Agricultural Markets in Africa," Toward a Political 
Economy of Development: A Rational Choice Perspective. 1998.  
 
Bernard, Mitchell. "Globalisation, the State and Financial Reform in the East Asian NICs: 
The Case of Korea and Taiwan," in The New World Order in International Finance. 
edited by Geoffey R. D. Underhill. Macmillan Press. 1997 
.  
Blake, Charles H. “Economic Reform and Democratization in Argentina and Uruguary: 
The Tortoise and the Hare Revisited”, Journal of InterAmerican Studies and World 
Affairs. 40(3).Autumn 1998. 
 
Bruck, Sebastian and Laixiang Sun. “Achieving Effective Governance under Divided 
Government and Private Interest Group Pressure: Taiwan’s 2001 Financial Holding 
Company Law,”  Journal of Contemporary China. 16(53). Nov. 2007. 
 
Bunce, V. “Democratization and Economic Reform,” Annual Review of Political Science. 4. 
2001. 
 
Chang, Ha-Joon, Hong-Jae Park and Chul Gyue Yoo. “Interpreting the Korean crisis: 
financial liberalization, industrial policy and corporate governance,” Cambridge 
Journal of Economics 22. 1998. 
Chang, Ha-Joon. "Korea: The Misunderstood Crisis," World Development 26-8. 1998.  
 
Chang, Ha-Joon. Globalization, Economic Development and the Role of the State. London 
and New York: Zed Books Ltd. 2003.  
 
Chen, Chien-Jen. "How has Taiwan withstood Asia's Financial Crisis," Government 
Information Office http://www.cultural-division.org 2001. 
Haeran Lim 
Democratization and Transformation in Korea and Taiwan 
CNAPS Visiting Fellow Working Paper 
33
 
Chen, Pochih. "The Role of Industrial Policy in Taiwan's Development," in Taiwan's 
Development Experience: Lessons on Roles of Government and Market. edited by 
Eric Thorbecke and Henry Wan, Jr. Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers. 1999.  
 
Chiachih, Hu. "General Process of Taiwan's Financial Liberalization and Financial reform," 
policy papers TIER. Taiwan. 2003. 
 
Chow, Peter C. Y. and Bates Gill eds. Weathering the Storm: Taiwan, Its Neighbors, and 
the Asian Financial Crisis. Brookings Institutions Press. 2000. 
 
Chu, Yun-han. "Surviving the East Asian Financial Storm: The Political Foundation of 
Taiwan's Economic Resilience," in The Politics of the Asian Economic Crisis. 
edited by T. J. Pempel. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press. 1999.  
 
Chu, Yun-han. "Re-engineering the Developmental State in an age of Globalization: 
Taiwan in Defiance of Neoliberalism," in Redefining Korean Politics: Lost 
Paradigm and New Vision. edited by Young Rae Kim et al. Korean Political 
Science Association. 2002.  
 
Chu, Yun-han, "Challenge and Change in East Asia: Taiwan's Year of Stress," Journal of 
Democracy 16(2). April 2005.  
 
Chung, Oscar. “Bigger Might Just Be Better,” Taiwan Review. 7/01. 2003. 
 
Cumings, Bruce, "The Origins and Development of the Northeast Asian Political 
Economy," in The Political Economy of the New Asian Industrialism. Edited by F. 
Deyo. 1987.  
 
Dahl, Robert. Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition. Yale University Press. 1971. 
 
Davis, Michael C. "East Asia After the Crisis: Human Rights, Constitutionalism, and State 
Reform," Human Rights Quarterly 26. 2004.  
 
Diamond, Larry and Marc F. Plattner. 1995. Economic Reform and Democracy. Baltimore 
and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press. 
 
Green, Stephen. 1998. “Taiwan in the 1990s: Macroeconomic Dilemmas and Response 
Strategies,” AntePodium. Vol. 5. 
 
Hall, Peter and David Soskice. Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of 
Comparative Advantage. 2001. 
 
Hahm, Joon-Ho and Joon-Jyung Kim. “Risks and Supervisory Challenges of Financial 
Haeran Lim 
Democratization and Transformation in Korea and Taiwan 
CNAPS Visiting Fellow Working Paper 
34
Conglomerates in Korea.” Korea Development Review 28(1), pp. 145-191. 2006.  
 
Harris, Richard, "Policy Networks and Economic Cooperation: Policy Coordination in the 
Asia Pacific," The Pacific Review 7(4). pp. 381-396. 1994.  
 
Her, Kelly. 2003. “Banks with Missions,” Taiwan Review. 7/01. 
 
Ito, Takatoshi and Anne O. Krueger. Eds. Financial Deregulation and Integration in East 
Asia. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press. 1996. 
 
Jang, Hoon. “Opening in Foreign Exchange Market and Financial Reform,” (in Korean). 
2003. 
 
Jayasuriya, Kanishka. "Globalization and the changing architecture of the state: the 
regulatory state and the politics of negative co-ordination," Journal of European 
Public Policy 8(1). February. 2001.  
 
Kang, David C. "Bad Loans to Good Friends: Money Politics and the Developmental State 
in South Korea," International Organization 56. Winter 2002.  
 
Kao, Leanne “Banking Sector Checkup,” Taiwan Review. 7/01. 2003. 
 
Kau, Michael Ying-mao. “The Power Structure in Taiwan’s Political Economy,” Asian 
Survey 36(3), March 1996. 
 
Kim, Eui-Young. "Globalization and Governance of Political Economy in Korea: with 
Emphasis on Association Governance," Korean Journal of International Political 
Science 41(2). (in Korean) 2001.  
 
Kim, Pan Suk. “Administrative Reform in Korean Central Government: A Case Study of 
the Dae Jung Kim Administration,” Public Performance & Management Review. 
24(2). 2000. 
 
Korea Development Institute. “10 years after the Economic Crisis: Evaluation and Tasks.” 
Policy Report. December 2007.  
 
Korea Public Fund Oversight Committee, Annual Report of Public Fund Oversight, various 
issues.  
 
Kuo, Chengtian. "New Financial Politics in Taiwan, Thailand, and Malaysia," manuscript 
National Science Council of Taiwan. 2001.  
 
Leahy, Chris. “When merger isn’t consolidation,” Euromoney. Sep. 2007. 
Lee, Keun, Byung-Kook Kim, Chung H. Lee, and Jaeyeol Yee. Visible Success and 
Haeran Lim 
Democratization and Transformation in Korea and Taiwan 
CNAPS Visiting Fellow Working Paper 
35
Invisible Failure in Post-Crisis Reform in the Republic of Korea: Interplay of 
Global Standards, Agents, and Local Specificity. World Bank Policy Research 
Working Paper 3651, June 2005. 
 
Lee, Yeon-Ho, Eugene Lim, and Suk-Kyu Chung. "A Rise of a Regulatory State and the 
Relation between the Government and the Industrial Sector in Korea," Korean 
Political Science Journal 36(3). (in Korean) 2002.  
 
Lew, Seok-Jin. “Politics of Financial Liberalization: Korea in the 1980s,” Dong-Ah 
Yeongoo. 49. (in Korean) 2005. 
 
Lim, Haeran. Korea’s Growth and Industrial Transformation. London: Macmillan Press 
Ltd. 1998. 
 
Lim, Haeran. "Financial Globalization and Taiwan's Responses: Focusing on Financial 
Liberalization and Financial Reforms," Korean Political Science Journal 37(5). (in 
Korean) 2003.  
 
Lim, Haeran. "Legacy of Developmental States: Industrial Policy and Governance in Korea 
and Taiwan," Presented at the Midwest Political Science Association. Chicago. 
April 2007.  
 
Loriaux, Michael, Meredith Woo-Cumings, Kent E. Calder, Sylvia Maxfield, and Sofia A. 
Perez. Capital Ungoverned: Liberalizing Finance in Interventionist States. Ithaca 
and London: Cornell University Press. 1997. 
 
Noble, Gregory.W. and John. Ravenhill. “The Good, the Bad and the Ugly? Korea, Taiwan 
and the Asian Fiancial Crisis,” edited by G.W. Noble and J. Ravenhill, The Asian 
Financial Crisis and the Architecture of Global Finance. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 2000. 
 
Onis, Ziya. "The logic of developmental state," Comparative Politics 24. October 1991.  
 
Pao, Maureen. “Flexibility is the key,” Far Eastern Economic Review. 164(46) Nov. 22 
2001. 
 
Pei, Minxin. 1995. “The Puzzle of East Asian Exceptionalism,” Larry Diamond and Marc F. 
Plattner. Economic Reform and Democracy. Baltimore and London: The Johns 
Hopkins University Press. 1995. 
 
Przeworski, Adam. Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in 
Eastern Europe and Latin America. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1991. 
 
Haeran Lim 
Democratization and Transformation in Korea and Taiwan 
CNAPS Visiting Fellow Working Paper 
36
Przeworski, Adam and Fernando Limongi, "Political Regimes and Economic Growth," 
Journal of Economic Perspective 51. 1993.  
 
Pye, Lucian W. “Money Politics and Transitions to Democracy in East Asian,” Asian 
Survey 37(3) Mar. 1997. 
 
Sato, Yukihito. "Democratization and Financial Reform in Taiwan: The Political Economy 
of Bad-Loan Creation," The Developing Economies XL-3. September 2002.  
 
Semkow, Brian Wallace. 1993. Taiwan’s Financial Markets and Institutions: The Legal 
and Financial Issues of Deregulation and Internationalization. London: Quorum 
Books. 
 
Shea, Jia-Dong. "Financial Reform of the Republic of China on Taiwan : the Domestic 
Perspective," Discussion paper. The Institute of Economics Academia Sinica. 
December 1993.  
 
Shea, Jia-Dong. "Taiwan: Development and Structural Change of the Financial System," in 
The Financial Development of Japan, Korea, and Taiwan. edited by Hugh T. 
Patrick and Yung Chul Park. New York Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1994.  
 
Shea, Jia-Dong and Ya-Hwei Yang. “Taiwan‘s Financial System and the Allocation of 
Investment Funds,” in The Role of the State in Taiwan's Development. Edited by 
Joel D. Aberbach, David Dollar and Sokoloff. New York: M.E. Sharpe. 1994. 
 
Shin, Jang-Sup. “South Korea: The Keynesian Recovery and the Costs of Structural 
Reform,” edited by K.S. Jomo, After the Storm: Crisis, Recovery, and Sustaining 
Development in Four Asian Economies. Singapore: Singapore University Press. 
2004. 
 
Sorenson, George. Democracy and Democratization. Boulder: West View Press. 1993. 
 
Taiwan Business Topics. American Chamber of Commerce in Taipei.  
 
Tan, Qingshan. “Democratization and bureaucratic restructuring in Taiwan,” Studies in 
Comparative International Development. New Brunswick, Summer. 2000. 
 
Thatcher, M. “Varieties of Capitalism in an Internationalized World: Domestic Institutional 
Change in European Telecommunications,” Comparative Political Studies 37(7). 
751-780. 2004. 
 
Thelen, Kathleen and Sven Steinmo. "Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics," 
in Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis. New 
York: Cambridge University Press. 1992.  
Haeran Lim 
Democratization and Transformation in Korea and Taiwan 
CNAPS Visiting Fellow Working Paper 
37
 
Thirkell-White, Ben. The IMF and the Politics of Financial Globalization: From the Asian 
Crisis to a New International Financial Architecture? New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan. 2005. 
 
Wade, Robert. Governing the Market: Economic Theory and the Role of Government in 
East Asian Industrialization. Princeton New Jersey: Princeton University Press. 
1990.  
 
Woo-Cumings, Meredith. “Toward the Market: South Korea,” in Loriaux, Michael et all 
eds., Capital Ungoverned: Liberalizing Finance in Interventionist States. Ithaca and 
London: Cornell University Press. 1997.  
 
Wu, Yu-Shan. “Taiwan’s Developmental State: After the Economic and Political Turmoil,” 
Asian Survey 47(6). 977-1001. 2007.  
 
Yang, Ya-Hwei. "Taiwan: Development and Structural Change of the Banking System," in 
The Financial Development of Japan, Korea, and Taiwan. edited by Hugh T. 
Patrick and Yung Chul Park. New York Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1994.  
 
Haeran Lim 
Democratization and Transformation in Korea and Taiwan 
CNAPS Visiting Fellow Working Paper 
38
